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UTILITY PATENT APPLICATION TRANSMITTAL (Only for new nonprovisional applications under 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b))	Attorney Docket No.	103.1043.01
	First Inventor or Application Identifier	Gaurav Banga et al
	Title	Prevention and Detection of IP Identification Wraparound Errors
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APPLICATION ELEMENTS See MPEP chapter 600 concerning utility patent application contents.	ADDRESS TO: Assistant Commissioner for Patents Box Patent Application Washington, DC 20231
1. <input type="checkbox"/> * Fee Transmittal Form (e.g., PTO/SB/17) (Submit an original and a duplicate for fee processing) 2. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Specification [Total Pages 47] (preferred arrangement set forth below) - Descriptive title of the Invention - Cross References to Related Applications - Statement Regarding Fed sponsored R & D - Reference to Microfiche Appendix - Background of the Invention - Brief Summary of the Invention - Brief Description of the Drawings (if filed) - Detailed Description - Claim(s) - Abstract of the Disclosure 3. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Drawing(s) (35 U.S.C. 113) [Total Sheets 7] 4. Oath or Declaration [Total Pages <input]<br="" type="checkbox"/> a. <input type="checkbox"/> Newly executed (original or copy) b. <input type="checkbox"/> Copy from a prior application (37 C.F.R. § 1.63(d)) (for continuation/divisional with Box 16 completed) i. <input type="checkbox"/> DELETION OF INVENTOR(S) Signed statement attached deleting inventor(s) named in the prior application, see 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.63(d)(2) and 1.33(b).	5. <input type="checkbox"/> Microfiche Computer Program (Appendix) 6. Nucleotide and/or Amino Acid Sequence Submission (if applicable, all necessary) a. <input type="checkbox"/> Computer Readable Copy b. <input type="checkbox"/> Paper Copy (identical to computer copy) c. <input type="checkbox"/> Statement verifying identity of above copies ACCOMPANYING APPLICATION PARTS 7. <input type="checkbox"/> Assignment Papers (cover sheet & document(s)) 8. <input type="checkbox"/> 37 C.F.R. § 3.73(b) Statement <input type="checkbox"/> Power of Attorney (when there is an assignee) 9. <input type="checkbox"/> English Translation Document (if applicable) 10. <input type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement (IDS)/PTO-1449 <input type="checkbox"/> Copies of IDS Citations 11. <input type="checkbox"/> Preliminary Amendment 12. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Return Receipt Postcard (MPEP 503) (Should be specifically itemized) 13. <input type="checkbox"/> * Small Entity Statement(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Statement filed in prior application, Status still proper and desired (PTO/SB/09-12) 14. <input type="checkbox"/> Certified Copy of Priority Document(s) (if foreign priority is claimed) 15. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other: Certificate of mailing

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- claims, 9 pgs.;
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This application is submitted in the name of the following inventors:

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Title of the Invention

Prevention and Detection of IP Identification Wraparound Errors

Background of the Invention

1. Field of the Invention

This invention relates to reassembly of data fragments of fragmented datagrams in a communication system. In particular, the invention relates to reducing and/or detecting a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments in a communication system utilizing the Internet Protocol (IP) caused by IP identification wraparound.

1 2. *Description of the Related Art*

2
3 The Internet Protocol (IP) has become one of the most widely used
4 communication protocols in the world. IP is part of a layered protocol, which means that another
5 higher level protocol typically uses IP for data communication. Examples of such higher level
6 protocols are the Transfer Control Protocol (TCP) and the User Datagram Protocol (UDP). In
7 addition, even higher level protocols are sometimes utilized, such as the Network File System
8 (NFS). These protocols are well known to those skilled in the art. The protocols are used to
9 send data from a sending station (e.g., a client or a server on a sending end of a communication)
10 to a receiving station (e.g., a client or a server on a receiving end of a communication), possibly
11 through one or more routing devices that form an IP path.

12
13 In order to send a TCP, UDP or other protocol datagram across an IP connection,
14 the datagram is encapsulated in an IP datagram. Often, the IP datagram must be fragmented into
15 plural IP data fragments in order to be sent using the physical network. For example, if a size of
16 the datagram exceeds the physical link's maximum transfer unit (MTU), that datagram must be
17 fragmented into plural IP data fragments with sizes that do not exceed the MTU. Then, a
18 receiving station reassembles the data fragments into the datagram.

19
20 A receiving station determines that data fragments belong to a single IP datagram
21 by looking at an IP identification number in a header of each data fragment. All data fragments

1 from the same IP datagram share the same IP identification number. In addition, the header of
2 each data fragment includes an offset from the start of the datagram, a length of the data
3 fragment, and a flag that indicates whether or not the datagram includes more data fragments.
4 This information is sufficient for reassembly of the IP datagram, which includes the original
5 TCP, UDP or other protocol datagram.

6
7 According to IP, the IP identification number is 16 bits long with a range of 0 to
8 65535. A sending station conventionally uses a simple counter to determine the IP identification
9 number for each IP datagram. In the early days of IP communications, a receiving station most
10 likely would receive all data fragments of a datagram with a particular IP identification number
11 and reassemble the datagram well before this counter could wrap around. If a data fragment was
12 lost, thereby making reassembly of a datagram impossible, all received data fragments of that
13 datagram would be discarded after a timeout of 64 seconds. With the slower communications
14 times that existed in the early days of the IP communications, this timeout was usually sufficient
15 to ensure data fragments would be discarded before the counter at the sending station could wrap
16 around.

17
18 However, today's Internet communications are much faster. Gigabit and 100Mb
19 Ethernet implementations are commonplace, and faster implementations are constantly being
20 developed. As the communications speed increases, the number of IP datagrams sent by a
21 sending station per unit of time also increases. Thus, the simple 16-bit counter conventionally

1 used to generate IP identification numbers wraps around much more quickly. In fact, in a high
2 speed setting, the counter can almost be guaranteed to wrap around within 64 seconds. Thus, a
3 receiving station can receive data fragments from two different IP datagrams that share a
4 common IP identification number before a first one of those datagrams is reassembled.

5
6 Because of the nature of IP communications, it is possible for a data fragment
7 from a second one of two datagrams to arrive at the receiving station before a corresponding data
8 fragment from a first one of the two datagrams. Then, if the two datagrams share a common IP
9 identification number due to wraparound of the sending station's IP identification number
10 counter, the receiving station can misassemble the data fragments. This misassembly can result
11 in corruption of the datagram.

12
13 For example, if first datagram A is fragmented into data fragments A1, A2, A3,
14 A4 and A5, and second datagram B is fragmented into data fragments B1, B2, B3 and B4, it is
15 possible for a receiving station to receive the data fragment B2 before data fragment A2. Then, if
16 datagram A and datagram B share a common IP identification number due to wraparound of the
17 sending station's IP identification number counter, the receiving station can misassemble data
18 fragments A1, B2, A3, A4 and A5 into a datagram, which of course would not contain the proper
19 data.
20

1 Higher level protocols such as TCP and UDP utilize checksums and length checks
2 in an attempt to catch such data corruption. However, the UDP checksum is only 16 bits long. It
3 has been found that in a high speed environment, IP misassembly errors might occur with
4 sufficient frequency that eventually a "false positive" checksum can result. In this case, the
5 checksum can indicate that the UDP datagram has been properly reassembled, while in fact the
6 datagram has been corrupted. Other properties of conventional IP exacerbate this situation, such
7 as IP's acceptance of overlapping data fragments during datagram reassembly. In a UDP
8 communication setting, these types of errors can lead to undetected data corruption. This data
9 corruption might only come to light when the data is actually utilized, a situation that preferably
10 should be avoided.

11 Summary of the Invention

12 The invention addresses the foregoing concerns by implementing measures
13 designed to reduce a likelihood of misassembly of received data fragments from fragmented IP
14 datagrams. In addition, the invention implements measures designed to detect when a likelihood
15 of such misassembly is high so that appropriate corrective policies can be implemented.
16
17

18
19 One embodiment of an aspect of the invention is a method of generating IP
20 identification numbers for IP datagrams. In this embodiment, a plurality of IP identification
21 number generators is maintained. A plurality of receiving stations are associated with the

1 plurality of IP identification number generators such that each receiving station has an IP
2 identification number generator associated therewith. An IP identification number for a
3 datagram sent to one of the receiving stations is generated based on an output of the associated IP
4 identification number generator. This method preferably is performed by an IP layer of a sending
5 station's communication system.

6
7 By using plural number generators, this aspect of the invention slows down
8 wraparound of IP identification numbers used for communication with any given receiving
9 station.

10
11 Preferably, each of the IP identification number generators has at least one
12 receiving station associated therewith. At least one of the IP identification number generators
13 preferably has plural receiving stations associated therewith. In one embodiment, the plurality of
14 IP identification number generators forms an array of number generators such as 16-bit counters.
15 Preferably, the plurality of IP identification number generators is associated with the plurality of
16 receiving stations by hashing destination addresses for the receiving stations and, in one
17 embodiment, protocols for transmitting to those receiving stations so as to form an index to the
18 array. If the hashing includes protocol information, the hashing preferably is performed such that
19 at least half of the number generators in the array are associated with UDP protocol
20 communications.

1 An embodiment of another aspect of the invention is a method of reducing a
2 likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from fragmented IP datagrams. In this method, data
3 fragments of a datagram having an IP identification number are received. All received data
4 fragments of the datagram are discarded upon detection of receipt of an overlapping data
5 fragment having the IP identification number, wherein the overlapping data fragment overlaps
6 data in an already-received data fragment. The overlapping data fragment can overlap all or less
7 than all of the already-received data fragment(s). This method preferably is performed by an IP
8 layer of a receiving station's communication system.

9 An embodiment of another aspect of the invention also is a method of reducing a
10 likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from fragmented IP datagrams. According to this
11 method, a timeout for reassembling the datagrams is reduced to less than a standard timeout.
12 Preferably, the datagram reassembly timeout is reduced to 45 seconds from the standard timeout
13 of 64 seconds. Alternatively, the datagram reassembly timeout is dynamically reduced based on
14 NFS data for round-trip times between a sending station and a receiving station. This method
15 preferably is performed by an IP layer of a receiving station's communication system.

16 Yet another aspect of the invention is embodied in a method of reducing a
17 likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from fragmented IP datagrams. This method
18 includes the steps of receiving data fragments of a datagram having an IP identification number,
19 and reducing a remaining time for reassembling the datagram upon detection of a gap in the
20 and reducing a remaining time for reassembling the datagram upon detection of a gap in the
21

1 received data fragments. Preferably, the remaining time for reassembling the datagram is
2 reduced to eight seconds. This method also preferably is performed by an IP layer of a receiving
3 station's communication system.

4
5 An additional aspect of the invention is embodied in another method of reducing a
6 likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from fragmented IP datagrams. According to this
7 method, data fragments of a first datagram are received, with the data fragments each having a
8 protocol identification number, a source address, and a first IP identification number. A
9 remaining time for reassembling the datagram is reduced upon detection, before receipt of a last
10 data fragment of the first datagram, of a data fragment of a second datagram having the protocol
11 identification number and the source address but having a second IP identification number.
12 Preferably, the remaining time for reassembling the datagram is reduced to eight seconds. This
13 method also preferably is performed by an IP layer of a receiving station's communication
14 system.

15
16 A further aspect of the invention is embodied in a method of detecting a
17 likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from fragmented IP datagrams. In this embodiment,
18 communication errors between a sending station and a receiving station are detected. The
19 likelihood of misassembly is determined to be high upon detection that the communication errors
20 occur at a high rate for a predefined period of time. The communication errors that are detected
21 can include communication errors detected by an IP layer of the receiving station's

1 communication system. Such IP communication errors include, but are not limited to, receipt of
2 overlapping data fragments and IP datagram reassembly timeout errors. The communication
3 errors that are detected also can include communication errors detected by a UDP layer of the
4 receiving station's communication system. Such UDP communication errors include, but are not
5 limited to, UDP length errors and UDP checksum errors. The communication errors that are
6 detected also can include communication errors detected by an NFS layer of the sending station's
7 communication system.

8
9
10 Preferably, upon detection that the likelihood of misassembly is high, policies are
11 implemented to reduce the likelihood of misassembly of data fragments. Examples of
12 implementations of such policies include, but are not limited to, preferentially using TCP instead
13 of UDP, using additional checksums and presenting a warning message to a system
14 administrator.

15 Another aspect of the invention is embodied in a method for a sending station to
16 detect a likelihood of misassembly at a receiving station of data fragments from fragmented IP
17 datagrams. This method includes the steps of determining a rate at which an IP identification
18 number generator associated with the receiving station wraps around, and determining that the
19 likelihood of misassembly at the receiving station is high upon determination that the IP
20 identification number generator wraps around at faster than a predetermined rate. Preferably, the

1 predetermined rate is once every ninety seconds. Alternatively, NFS re-transmissions also are
2 considered when determining if a likelihood of datagram misassembly is high.

3
4 Policies are preferably implemented to reduce the likelihood of misassembly of
5 data fragments upon determining that the likelihood of misassembly is high. Examples of such
6 policies include, but are not limited to, preferentially using TCP instead of UDP, using additional
7 checksums, and presenting a warning message to a system administrator. When the sending
8 station maintains plural IP identification number generators, such policies also can include
9 reducing a number of receiving stations associated with the IP identification number generator
10 that is wrapping around at faster than the predetermined rate.

11
12 Each of the foregoing methods can be used in conjunction with the others in
13 various combinations to reduce and/or to detect a likelihood of misassembly of IP datagrams.
14 The invention also includes apparatuses such as sending and receiving stations configured to
15 perform the foregoing methods, computer readable code by itself or embodied in a computer
16 program product to cause a computer to perform the foregoing methods, and a memory storing
17 information including instructions executable by a processor to perform the foregoing methods.

18
19 This brief summary has been provided so that the nature of the invention may be
20 understood quickly. A more complete understanding of the invention may be obtained by

1 reference to the following description of the preferred embodiments thereof in connection with
2 the attached drawings.

3
4 Brief Description of the Drawings

5
6 Figure 1 is a representational view of communication between a sending station
7 and a receiving station across a network such as the Internet.

8
9 Figure 2 is a representational view of a sending station using plural identification
10 number generators to generate IP identification numbers.

11
12 Figure 3 is a representational view of a receiving station discarding a datagram
13 upon detection of an overlapping data fragment.

14
15 Figure 4 is a representational view of a receiving station discarding a datagram
16 upon detection of a partially overlapping data fragment.

17
18 Figure 5 is a representational view of a reduced timeout for reassembling
19 datagrams at a receiving station.

1 Figure 6 is a representational view of a receiving station reducing a remaining
2 time for reassembling a datagram upon detection of a gap in received data fragments of the
3 datagram.
4

5 Figure 7 is a representational view of a receiving station reducing a remaining
6 time for reassembling a datagram upon detection of a data fragment from another datagram
7 having that same source address and protocol as the datagram but a different IP identification
8 number.
9

10 Figure 8 is a flowchart for explaining determination that a likelihood of
11 misassembly of datagrams is high upon detection of a high rate of communication errors for a
12 period of time.
13

14 Figure 9 is a flowchart for explaining determination that a likelihood of
15 misassembly of datagrams is high upon determination that an IP identification number generator
16 wraps around at faster than a predetermined rate.
17

18 Description of the Preferred Embodiment 19

20 In the following description, a preferred embodiment of the invention is described
21 with regard to preferred process steps and data structures. However, those skilled in the art

1 would recognize, after perusal of this application, that embodiments of the invention may be
2 implemented using one or more general purpose processors or special purpose processors
3 adapted to particular process steps and data structures operating under program control, that such
4 process steps and data structures can be embodied as information stored in or transmitted to and
5 from memories (e.g., fixed memories such as DRAMs, SRAMs, hard disks, caches, etc., and
6 removable memories such as floppy disks, CD-ROMs, data tapes, etc.), with the information
7 including instructions executable by such processors (e.g., object code that is directly executable,
8 source code that is executable after compilation, code that is executable through interpretation,
9 etc.), and that implementation of the preferred process steps and data structures described herein
10 using such equipment and structures would not require undue experimentation or further
11 invention.

12
13 Fig. 1 is a representational view of communication between a sending station and
14 a receiving station across a network such as the Internet. In Fig. 1, sending station 1 sends
15 information across network 2 to receiving station 3.

16
17 Sending station 1 can be a client sending data to a server, a server sending data to
18 a client, or any other device or entity sending data across network 2. Likewise, receiving station
19 3 can be a server receiving data from a client, a client receiving data from a server, or any other
20 device or entity receiving data across network 2.

1 A single device, such as a client or a server, can be both a sending station and a
2 receiving station, possibly simultaneously. For example, in typical two-way data
3 communications between a client and a server, the client is a sending station for communications
4 sent to the server and a receiving station for communications received from the server. Likewise,
5 the server is a receiving station for communications received from the client and a sending
6 station for communications sent to the client.

7
8 Sending station 1 communicates through a layered communication protocol.
9 Preferably, the layered communication protocol includes application layer 5, higher level layer 6
10 such as a Network File System (NFS) layer, transport layer 7 such as a Transfer Control Protocol
11 (TCP) layer, User Datagram Protocol (UDP) or other protocol layer, and Internet Protocol (IP)
12 layer 8. Various other combinations of layers are possible. For example, some sending stations
13 do not have higher level layer 6. Also, particular types of layers are designed to work with other
14 types of layers. For example, NFS was originally designed to work with UDP, not TCP. Finally,
15 some applications directly utilize the lower level UDP or IP layers, thereby bypassing much of
16 the error checking (e.g., checksum computations) provided by the higher level and application
17 layers. As data passes through each of the layers from an application program, each layer
18 performs operations on the data such as encapsulation.

19
20 Application layer 5 provides an interface for application programs to send data.
21 Application layer 5 might compute and add a checksum to the data. Such a checksum is useful

1 for ensuring data integrity at a receiving station. However, the application layer does not have to
2 use any such checksum.

3
4 Higher level layer 6 such as an NFS layer typically keeps track of network data.
5 This layer also can add a checksum, although such is not mandatory.

6
7 Transport layer 7 packages data in datagrams. Each datagram typically includes a
8 header and data. The data may be of various lengths. The header typically includes source and
9 address information, datagram length, and a checksum. For example, UDP specifies that a UDP
10 datagram has a header with a 16 bit source port number, a 16 bit destination port number, a 16 bit
11 UDP length, and a 16 bit checksum. The checksum is for both the datagram's header and data,
12 as well as for a pseudo-header that includes additional information (IP source address, IP
13 destination address, protocol, and datagram length).

14
15 IP layer 8 encapsulates UDP, TCP or other protocol datagrams into IP datagrams
16 in order to send those datagrams across network 2. Often, an IP datagram must be fragmented
17 into plural IP data fragments in order to be sent across network 2. For example, if a size of the
18 datagram exceeds a known maximum transfer unit (MTU) for network 2, that datagram must be
19 fragmented into plural IP data fragments with sizes that do not exceed the MTU.

1 IP layer 8 generates an IP identification number for each IP datagram. All data
2 fragments from the same IP datagram share the same IP identification number. In addition, the
3 header of each data fragment includes an offset from the start of the datagram, a length of the
4 data fragment, and a flag that indicates whether or not the datagram includes more data
5 fragments. This information is sufficient for a receiving station to reassemble the IP datagram,
6 which includes the original TCP, UDP or other protocol datagram. IP datagrams also include a
7 checksum, but only for the header information.

8
9 According to IP, the IP identification number is 16 bits long with a range of 0 to
10 65535. In a high-speed communications setting, a conventional sending station might send many
11 more than 65535 datagrams in a short period of time, causing this IP identification number to
12 wrap around quickly. Thus, a sending station might send data fragments from two different
13 datagrams with the same IP identification number to the same receiving station. This duplicate
14 IP identification number can cause the receiving station to try to misassemble some of these data
15 fragments into a single datagram.

16
17 In a setting where only a UDP data checksum is used to verify data integrity (e.g.,
18 an application checksum is not used or is bypassed and TCP is not used), some of these
19 misassembled datagrams can slip through the weak 16 bit UDP checksum. This problem is
20 exacerbated by the fact that the UDP checksum's strength is data-type dependent, resulting in
21 similar checksums for similar types of data. For example, a corrupt datagram resulting from

1 misassembly of mismatched text data fragments has better than a 1:65535 chance of resulting in
2 a checksum that matches the checksum for the original datagram.

3
4 In order to reduce a likelihood of wraparound of IP identification numbers for
5 datagrams sent to a particular receiving station, an IP layer according to the invention utilizes
6 plural IP identification number generators, as discussed below with respect to Fig. 2.

7
8 In order to help determine when a likelihood of misassembly of datagrams is high,
9 a sending station according to the invention can monitor for a high rate of communication errors
10 that might be the result of datagram misassembly, as discussed below with reference to Fig. 8.
11 The sending station also can monitors the IP identification number generator(s) for rapid
12 wraparound, as discussed below with reference to Fig. 9.

13
14 Returning to Fig. 1, network 2 preferably includes a plurality of routers 10.
15 Examples of network 2 include the Internet, an intranet, an Ethernet network, and any other
16 network or virtual network that utilizes IP communications. The particular configuration of
17 network 2 is representational only of the inclusion of many routers and many possible
18 communication paths through network 2. This configuration has no other significance, and any
19 other configuration that allows communications through network 2 can be utilized with the
20 invention. For example, network 2 could be replaced with a single router 10 between sending
21 station 1 and receiving station 3.

Each of routers 10 can have an MTU smaller than the sizes of data fragments sent to that router. If a router receives a data fragment larger than the router's MTU, the router can further fragment the data fragment. Each data fragment of a datagram can take a different path through network 2. The routers along these different paths can have different MTUs. Thus, data fragments of a single datagram received by a receiving station can have different sizes.

Receiving station 3 also communicates through a layered communication protocol. Preferably, the layered communication protocol includes layers corresponding to layers in sending stations that might send data to the receiving station. Thus, in Fig. 1, the layered communication protocol of receiving station 3 includes IP layer 12, transport layer 13 such as a TCP, UDP or other protocol layer, higher level layer 14 such as an NFS layer, and application layer 15. Various other combinations of layers are possible, and some applications directly utilize the lower level UDP or IP layers, thereby bypassing much of the error checking (e.g., checksum verifications) provided by the higher level and application layers. As data passes through each of the layers to an application program, each layer performs operations on the data such as decapsulation.

IP layer 12 reassembles data fragments into datagrams based on IP identification numbers, length data and flags in the headers of those data fragments. Reassembly time for a datagram is limited by a timeout. If datagram reassembly time from when a first data fragment of

1 a datagram is received exceeds the timeout, all data fragments associated with the datagram are
2 discarded.

3
4 IP layer 12 also verifies a header checksum for received unfragmented datagrams
5 and data fragments, but this checksum only verifies the integrity of the associated IP headers.
6 This checksum therefore does not generally help prevent or detect data fragment misassembly, at
7 least because such misassembly can occur with completely self-consistent IP headers.

8
9
10 In order to reduce a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from different
11 datagrams that have the same IP identification number, an IP layer of a receiving station
12 according to the invention can take several actions. The IP layer can discard all data fragments of
13 a datagram if an overlapping data fragment is received, as discussed below with reference to
14 Figs. 3 and 4. The IP layer also can reduce a timeout for datagram reassembly. The overall
15 timeout can be reduced, as discussed below with reference to Fig. 5. In addition, the time for
16 reassembly can be dynamically reduced if a gap is detected in received data fragments of a
17 datagram, as discussed below with respect to Fig. 6, or if a data fragment from another datagram
18 with a different IP identification number is received from the same source with the same
19 protocol, as discussed below with respect to Fig. 7.

20 In order to help determine when a likelihood of misassembly of datagrams is high,
21 a receiving station according to the invention can monitor for a high rate of communication

1 errors that might be the result of datagram misassembly, as discussed below with reference to
2 Fig. 8.

3
4 Transport layer 8 strips the TCP, UDP or other protocol header off of a datagram,
5 as appropriate. Both TCP and UDP can verify a checksum for the resulting data. However, as
6 noted above, the UDP checksum is relatively weak. It should be noted that the TCP checksum
7 also is not perfect. Corrupt data sometimes passes the TCP checksum, albeit with significantly
8 less frequency than with the UDP checksum.

9
10 The length of the datagram preferably also is verified by the transport layer.
11 However, many length errors are corrected in the IP layer's datagram reassembly. For example, a
12 750 byte data fragment inserted into a space for a 500 byte data fragment during datagram
13 reassembly typically will not result in a UDP or TCP length error because the IP layer truncates
14 overlong data fragments. Thus, length error checking also may not help catch datagram
15 misassembly.

16
17 Higher level layer 14 preferably works in conjunction with higher level layer 6 in
18 sending station 1 to keep track of and to manage network data. Higher level layer 14 also can
19 provide data integrity verification through checksums, although use of such checksums is not
20 mandatory.

1 Application layer 15 provides an interface for an application program to receive
2 data. This layer also optionally can provide a checksum and error checking.

3
4 As is evident from the discussion above, many layers of an layered protocol used
5 for network communications can provide checksums and other error detection measures.
6 However, one common method for network communications is to have application programs
7 directly communicate using UDP and IP. The only data checksum in this configuration is the
8 UDP checksum, which is weak enough that it might miss some misassembly of data fragments.
9 The invention provides techniques for decreasing the likelihood of such misassembly, as well as
10 for detecting when a likelihood of misassembly is high.

11
12 Fig. 2 is a representational view of a sending station using plural identification
13 number generators to generate IP identification numbers.

14
15 Briefly, IP identification numbers for IP datagrams are generated. To generate
16 these identification numbers, a plurality of IP identification number generators are maintained. A
17 plurality of receiving stations are associated with the plurality of IP identification number
18 generators such that each receiving station has an IP identification number generator associated
19 therewith. An IP identification number is generated for a datagram sent to one of the receiving
20 stations based on an output of the associated IP identification number generator. Preferably, the

1 IP identification numbers are generated in an IP layer of a sending station's communication
2 system.

3
4 In more detail, Fig. 2 shows sending station 1 with array 17 of N plural IP
5 identification number generators 18. N preferably is a power of two to simplify indexing and
6 hashing, which are discussed below. Examples of N are 16 and 256. Each of IP identification
7 number generators 18 preferably is a 16-bit counter, corresponding to the 16 bits needed for an IP
8 identification number.

9
10 In order to associate a receiving station with an IP identification number
11 generator, sending station 1 preferably uses the receiving station's address. Optionally, sending
12 station 1 also uses the protocol for a particular datagram to be sent to that receiving station.
13 Preferably, the datagram's transport protocol (i.e., TCP, UDP or other protocol) is used for this
14 protocol. As shown in Fig. 2, receiving station address and protocol 20 for a datagram are
15 hashed by hash 21 to form index 22 to array 17.

16
17 In the preferred embodiment, there are more than N possible combinations of
18 receiving station addresses and protocols. In fact, sending station 1 may send data to more than
19 N separate receiving stations. Therefore, more than one receiving station can be associated with
20 each of IP identification number generators 18.

1 Hash 21 preferably is designed so that IP identification number generators 18 are
2 distributed fairly evenly among the receiving stations. Preferably, if there are more than N
3 receiving stations, each of plural IP identification number generators 18 has at least one receiving
4 station associated therewith.

5
6 Furthermore, because UDP tends to be more susceptible to datagram misassembly
7 than other transport protocols, hash 21 preferably is designed so that half of IP identification
8 number generators 18 are associated with UDP. The other half of IP identification number
9 generators 18 preferably are associated with all other protocols. Thus, each receiving station
10 preferably will have an IP identification number generator associated therewith for UDP
11 datagrams and an IP identification number generator associated therewith for all other protocol
12 datagrams. This feature of hash 21 can be implemented by including a "UDP/non-UDP" bit in
13 hash 21.
14

15 Whenever sending station 1 needs to send an IP datagram to a receiving station,
16 sending station 1 preferably sends receiving station address and protocol 20 for that datagram
17 through hash 21 to form index 22. Index 22 is then used to index to one of the plural IP
18 identification number generators 18, which provides the identification number and then
19 increments (or vice versa).
20

By virtue of the foregoing arrangement, a single IP identification number generator is not shared among all receiving stations. Rather, each of plural IP identification number generators is shared only among the associated receiving station/protocol combinations. Wraparound of IP identification numbers for datagrams sent to a particular receiving station using a particular protocol thereby tends to be greatly slowed, reducing a likelihood that data fragments from two datagrams having the same IP identification number will be sent to the same receiving station before reassembly timeout.

Figs. 3 to 6 are representational views that illustrate various techniques by which a receiving station can further reduce a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from two different datagrams. In each of these figures, a data fragment is represented by a small box. A letter in the box represents a datagram to which the data fragment belongs, and a number in the box represents the data fragment's position in the datagram. A small numeral to the upper right of each box indicates an order in which the data fragments have been received by the receiving station in each illustrated example. A data fragment that has not been received does not have such a numeral and is designated by a broken outline (see, e.g., data fragment A2 in Fig. 3). Finally, a numeral under each data fragment indicates a size of the data fragment in bytes.

It should be noted that the details shown in Figs. 3 to 6, such as specific orders, sizes and compositions of data fragments and datagrams, are provided solely to clarify aspects of the invention discussed with respect to each figure and are for illustrative purposes only. The

1 invention is in no way limited to those particular details, as will be apparent to one skilled in the
2 art.

3
4 Fig. 3 is a representational view of a receiving station discarding a datagram upon
5 detection of an overlapping data fragment.

6
7 Briefly, a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from fragmented IP
8 datagrams is reduced. Data fragments of a datagram having an IP identification number are
9 received. All received data fragments of the datagram are discarded upon detection of receipt of
10 an overlapping data fragment having the IP identification number, wherein the overlapping data
11 fragment overlaps data in an already-received data fragment. Preferably, this technique is
12 performed by an IP layer of a receiving station's communication system.

13
14 In more detail, receiving station 3 in Fig. 3 has received data fragments A1, A3,
15 A4 and A5. Data fragment A2 has not been received. Subsequently, data fragment B1 has been
16 received. Datagrams A and B have identical IP identification numbers in Fig. 3, for example as a
17 result of an IP identification number generator wrapping around in a sending station that sent
18 datagrams A and B. Thus, data fragment B1 overlaps data fragment A1. In other words, if data
19 fragment B1 was assembled into a datagram with data fragment A1, some data from one of the
20 data fragments would overlap data from the other data fragment. This overlapping corresponds

1 to a situation where misassembly can occur, for example if a data fragment B2 was subsequently
2 received. In Fig. 3, data fragment B1 overlaps all of data fragment A1.

3
4 According to the invention, receiving station 3 determines that data fragment B1
5 has overlapped data fragment A1. Upon determining that such overlapping has occurred, a
6 receiving station according to the invention discards all received data fragments for the datagram
7 with the overlapped data fragment. In Fig. 3, the datagram with overlapped data fragment A1 is
8 datagram A, so data fragments A1, A3, A4 and A5 are discarded. The invention similarly would
9 have discard all received data fragments for datagram A if another of its data fragments had been
10 overlapped instead of data fragment A1, for example data fragment A3, A4 or A5.

11
12 By virtue of the foregoing operation, a sending station discards data fragments
13 before misassembly can occur in some situations.

14
15 Fig. 4 is a representational view of a receiving station discarding a datagram upon
16 detection of a partially overlapping data fragment. In Fig. 4, receiving station 3 has received data
17 fragments A1, A3, A4 and A5. Data fragment A2 has not been received. Subsequently, data
18 fragment B2 has been received. Data fragment B2 has a size of 750 bytes, versus the 500 byte
19 size of data fragments A1, A3, A4 and A5. Such a difference in data fragment size can occur, for
20 example, if data fragment B2 traveled across network 2 along a path that had an MTU of 750

1 bytes, while the rest of the data fragments traveled across network 2 along paths with MTUs of
2 500 bytes.

3
4 Datagrams A and B have identical IP identification numbers in Fig. 4. In this
5 situation, the first 500 bytes of data fragment B2 do not overlap any received data fragments of
6 datagram A. However, the last 250 bytes of data fragment B2 do overlap part of data fragment
7 A3. A receiving station according to the invention preferably would detect this overlap and
8 would therefore discard data fragments A1, A3, A4 and A5. Thus, the invention preferably
9 discards data fragments of a datagram when any data in any of those data fragments is overlapped
10 by any data in a subsequently received data fragment with the same IP identification number.

11
12 By virtue of the foregoing operation, a receiving station discards data fragments
13 before misassembly can occur in more situations than if only overlap of entire data fragments
14 was acted upon.
15

16 Fig. 5 is a representational view of a reduced timeout for reassembling datagrams
17 at a receiving station.

18
19 Briefly, a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from fragmented IP
20 datagrams is reduced by reducing a timeout for reassembling the datagrams to less than a

1 standard timeout. Preferably, this technique is performed by an IP layer of a receiving station's
2 communication system.

3
4 In more detail, receiving station 3 in Fig. 5 has received data fragments A1 and
5 A3 of datagram A and data fragment B2 of datagram B. Data fragment A2 has not been
6 received. Datagrams A and B have identical IP identification numbers. Accordingly, data
7 fragments A1, B2 and A3 could be misassembled into a corrupted datagram as long as the data
8 fragments were all received before a timeout for datagram reassembly using data fragments A1
9 and A3.

10
11 In Fig. 5, time line 23 illustrates a standard IP datagram assembly timeout of 64
12 seconds. Data fragment B2 is received within this time frame, so if this standard timeout was
13 used, misassembly could occur. However, a receiving station according to the invention
14 preferably uses a reduced timeout such as that illustrated by time line 24. This timeout ends
15 before receipt of data fragment B2, preventing any chance of misassembly in the example shown
16 in Fig. 5.

17
18 A timeout of 45 seconds has been found to produce good result in terms of
19 allowing enough time for proper datagram reassembly while preventing some datagram
20 misassembly. Alternatively, the timeout could be determined based on network data for expected
21 communication (e.g., round-trip) times between a particular sending station and a particular

1 receiving station. Such network data preferably could be provided by an NFS layer of each
2 station's communication system.

3
4 Fig. 6 is a representational view of a receiving station reducing a remaining time
5 for reassembling a datagram upon detection of a gap in received data fragments of the datagram.

6
7 Briefly, a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from fragmented IP
8 datagrams is reduced. Data fragments of a datagram having an IP identification number are
9 received. A remaining time for reassembling the datagram is reduced upon detection of a gap in
10 the received data fragments. Preferably, this technique is performed by an IP layer of a receiving
11 station's communication system.

12
13 In more detail, receiving station 3 in Fig. 6 has received data fragments A1 and
14 A3 of datagram A. Data fragment A2 has not been received, creating a gap in the received data
15 fragments. The gap can be detected by examining the lengths and offsets included in the headers
16 of the received data fragments. This gap indicates that data fragment A2 might have been lost in
17 transit, opening up the opportunity for a data fragment from another datagram to be improperly
18 inserted into this gap during reassembly. Accordingly, a receiving station according to the
19 invention reduces an amount of time left for receipt of the missing data fragment and reassembly
20 of the datagram.

1 Reducing the remaining reassembly time to eight seconds in such a situation has
2 been found to produce good results. Eight seconds has been found generally to allow enough
3 time for receipt of a data fragment that has been merely delayed, while generally not allowing
4 enough time for transmission of another datagram with the same IP identification number as the
5 datagram with the gap.
6

7 Of course, if the remaining time before timeout is less than eight seconds, only the
8 remaining time is allowed before timeout. In other words, the remaining time is not increased to
9 eight seconds if it is already less than eight seconds.
10

11 By virtue of the foregoing operation, fewer opportunities for datagram
12 misassembly tend to occur.
13

14 Fig. 7 is a representational view of a receiving station reducing a remaining time
15 for reassembling a datagram upon detection of a data fragment from another datagram having
16 that same source address and protocol as the datagram but a different IP identification number.
17

18 Briefly, a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from fragmented IP
19 datagrams is reduced. Data fragments of a first datagram are received, with the datagram having
20 a protocol identification number, a source address, and a first IP identification number. A
21 remaining time for reassembling the first datagram is reduced upon detection, before receipt of a

1 last data fragment of the first datagram, of a data fragment of a second datagram having the
2 protocol identification number and the source address but having a second IP identification
3 number. Preferably, this technique is performed by an IP layer of a receiving station's
4 communication system.

5
6 In more detail, one problem with attempting to detect a gap in data fragments is
7 that IP does not provide enough information to directly detect loss of a last data fragment or
8 fragments of a datagram. In particular, IP data fragments indicate if they are or are not a last data
9 fragment. The only indication of relative positions of intermediate IP data fragments are offsets
10 from a start of the datagram. These offsets provide no information about how many data
11 fragments follow a given data fragment. Thus, if a last data fragment of a first datagram is lost, a
12 receiving station only knows that it has received some data fragments of the first datagram but
13 has not yet received a last data fragment. In this situation, the receiving station might receive
14 before timeout a data fragment from another datagram that happens to match the first datagram's
15 IP identification number. This occurrence can lead to misassembly of the first datagram.

16
17 Typically, a sending station will send all of a datagram in a particular protocol to a
18 particular receiving station before sending another datagram in that protocol to that receiving
19 station. Thus, possible loss of a last data fragment of a first datagram can be indicated by receipt
20 of a data fragment from a second datagram sent by the same sending station as the first datagram
21 using the same protocol. A receiving station can tell that the data fragment is from the second

1 datagram by checking for a different IP identification number than that used by the first
2 datagram. Accordingly, in order to help prevent misassembly, a sending station can reduce a
3 time remaining for reassembling a datagram upon receipt of a data fragment from another
4 datagram having that same source address and protocol as the datagram but a different IP
5 identification number.

6
7 Accordingly, receiving station 3 in Fig. 7 has received data fragments A1, A2, A3
8 and A4 of datagram A, but not last data fragment A5. Receiving station 3 has no way of
9 knowing if data fragment A5 is a last data fragment of datagram A. Receiving station 3 has
10 subsequently received data fragment C1 of datagram C. Datagrams A and C have different IP
11 identification numbers. Therefore, no overlapping can occur. Also, data fragments from
12 datagram C will not be misassembled with data fragments from datagram A (barring other
13 processing errors).

14
15 However, because datagram C shares the same source address and protocol as
16 datagram A, it is likely that the last data fragment or fragments of datagram A have already been
17 sent to receiving station 3 and may be lost. Therefore, receiving station 3 according to the
18 invention preferably reduces a remaining time for receipt of the last data fragment or fragments
19 and reassembly of the datagram. Reducing the remaining time to eight seconds has been found
20 to produce good results, allowing for receipt of merely delayed data fragments while still tending
21 to prevent misassembly.

1 The foregoing methods are designed to decrease a likelihood of datagram
2 misassembly. Even if misassembly occurs, UDP and other checksums probably will catch most
3 of the misassembled packets. However, a misassembled packet eventually might slip past the
4 checksums, especially if only UDP checksums are used, with possibly dire consequences for data
5 integrity. Thus, the invention also provides techniques for detecting when a likelihood of
6 datagram misassembly is high so that appropriate corrective action can be taken.

7
8 Fig. 8 is a flowchart for explaining determination that a likelihood of misassembly
9 of datagrams is high upon detection of a high rate of communication errors for a period of time.

10
11 Briefly, a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from fragmented IP
12 datagrams is detected. In order to detect this likelihood, communication errors between a
13 sending station and a receiving station are detected. The likelihood of misassembly is
14 determined to be high upon detection that the communication errors occur at a high rate for a
15 predefined period of time.

16
17 In more detail, step S801 in Fig. 8 detects if communication errors are occurring
18 at a high rate for a period of time. This error detection can be performed at a sending station or at
19 a receiving station, both with respect to the station itself and with respect to other stations.

1 The types of errors indicative of datagram misassembly include IP layer
2 overlapping errors, IP layer timeout, UDP length errors, UDP checksum errors, and NFS errors.
3 Other errors also might be indicative of datagram misassembly.
4

5 IP layer overlapping errors can be flagged by a station's IP layer when overlapping
6 occurs as discussed above with respect to Figs. 3 and 4. Likewise, IP timeout errors can be the
7 result of reduced timeout and reassembly times as discussed above with respect to Figs. 5, 6 and
8 7. UDP length and checksum errors can be the direct result of datagram misassembly that is
9 properly caught by UDP error checking mechanisms. NFS errors can be the result of
10 misassembly errors that slipped through the IP and UDP error checking mechanisms. NFS errors
11 can be implied from an increased rate of NFS re-transmissions.

12
13 Datagram misassembly and situations that create an opportunity for datagram
14 misassembly have been found to create sustained higher rates of one or more of these types of
15 errors. Thus, if such errors are detected, flow proceeds from step S801 to S802, and it is
16 determined that a likelihood of datagram misassembly at the associated receiving stations is high.

17
18 With a high likelihood of datagram misassembly comes an increased chance that a
19 misassembled datagram will pass UDP's weak checksum. Accordingly, flow preferably
20 proceeds from step S802 to step S803, where policies are implemented to decrease the likelihood
21 of datagram misassembly and to increase a likelihood of catching misassembled datagrams.

1 Examples of the policies implemented in step S803 include using TCP instead of
2 UDP, if possible. TCP avoids reliance upon IP fragmentation. In addition, additional checksums
3 can be used. These additional checksums can include application checksums that are much
4 stronger than those typically used by communication protocols, possibly incorporating extremely
5 strong hashing functions such as MD5 and SH1. If UDP checksumming is turned off, it can be
6 turned on. NFS, application, and/or other checksums can be utilized, if possible. Furthermore, a
7 warning can be sent to the system administrators of both the sending and the receiving stations so
8 that the source of the errors can be tracked down and corrected.

9
10 Some of these policies may not be possible to implement in every situation. For
11 example, if a server is implementing the policies, the server may not be able to dictate use of
12 additional checksums to a client. Likewise, TCP may not be available between a particular
13 sending station and a particular receiving station. In these situations, policies preferably are not
14 implemented that prevent communications. Of course, if data integrity is essential,
15 communications with a station that is experiencing high error rates can be discontinued.

16
17 Fig. 9 is a flowchart for explaining determination that a likelihood of misassembly
18 of datagrams is high upon determination that an IP identification number generator wraps around
19 at faster than a predetermined rate.

1 Briefly, a sending station detects a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments
2 from fragmented IP datagrams sent to a receiving station. In order to detect this likelihood, the
3 sending station determines a rate at which an IP identification number generator associated with
4 the receiving station wraps around. The likelihood of misassembly at the receiving station is
5 determined to be high upon determination that the IP identification number generator wraps
6 around at faster than a predetermined rate.

7
8 In more detail, in step S901 of Fig. 9, a sending station determines a rate at which
9 its IP identification number generator(s) wrap around. In step S902, it is determined if this rate
10 exceeds a predetermined threshold for any particular IP identification number generator. A
11 predetermined threshold of 90 seconds has been found to work well.

12
13 If an IP identification number generator wraps around at faster than the
14 predetermined rate, a possibility exists that two datagrams having the same IP identification
15 number will be sent to a receiving station before the first of the two datagrams times out, thereby
16 creating an opportunity for datagram misassembly. Accordingly, if the threshold is exceeded,
17 flow proceeds to step S903. In step S903, it is determined that a likelihood of datagram
18 misassembly at the associated receiving stations is high.

19
20 Flow then proceeds to step S904, where policies are implemented to address the
21 high likelihood of datagram misassembly. For example, if the sending station is utilizing plural

1 IP identification number generators, the association between the number generators and the
2 receiving stations can be changed so that fewer receiving stations are associated with the number
3 generator that is wrapping around too quickly. With reference to Fig. 2 above, one technique of
4 changing this association is to change hash 21.

5
6 In addition, policies along the lines of those discussed above with respect to step
7 S803 in Fig. 8 also can be implemented. Again, unless data integrity is essential, only those
8 policies that can be implemented without discontinuing communications preferably are
9 implemented.
10

11 *Alternative Embodiments*

12
13 Each of the techniques discussed above can be used in conjunction with the
14 others. For example, a sending station can check for communication errors in conjunction with a
15 high rate of IP identification number generator wraparound. Other combinations of the foregoing
16 techniques are possible. Thus, while preferred embodiments of the invention are disclosed
17 herein, many variations are possible which remain within the content, scope and spirit of the
18 invention, and these variations would become clear to those skilled in the art after perusal of this
19 application.

20 //

21 //

Claims

We claim:

1. A method of generating IP identification numbers for IP datagrams, comprising the steps of:

maintaining a plurality of IP identification number generators;
associating a plurality of receiving stations with the plurality of IP identification number generators such that each receiving station has an IP identification number generator associated therewith; and

generating an IP identification number for a datagram sent to one of the receiving stations based on an output of the associated IP identification number generator.

2. A method as in claim 1, wherein each of the IP identification number generators has at least one receiving station associated therewith.

3. A method as in claim 1, wherein at least one of the IP identification number generators has plural receiving stations associated therewith.

4. A method as in claim 1, wherein the plurality of IP identification number generators forms an array of number generators.

1 5. A method as in claim 4, wherein the array of number generators is an array of
2 counters.

3
4 6. A method as in claim 5, wherein the counters are 16-bit counters.

5
6 7. A method as in claim 4, wherein the plurality of IP identification number
7 generators is associated with the plurality of receiving stations by hashing destination addresses
8 for the receiving stations so as to form an index to the array.

9
10 8. A method as in claim 4, wherein the plurality of IP identification number
11 generators is associated with the plurality of receiving stations by hashing destination addresses
12 for the receiving stations and protocols for transmitting to those receiving stations so as to form
13 an index to the array.

14
15 9. A method as in claim 8, wherein hashing is performed such that at least half of
16 the number generators in the array are associated with UDP protocol communications.

17
18 10. A method as in claim 1, wherein the steps are performed by an IP layer of a
19 sending station's communication system.

1 11. A method of reducing a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from
2 fragmented IP datagrams, comprising the steps of:
3 receiving data fragments of a datagram having an IP identification number; and
4 discarding all received data fragments of the datagram upon detection of receipt of
5 an overlapping data fragment having the IP identification number, wherein the overlapping data
6 fragment overlaps data in an already-received data fragment.

7
8 12. A method as in claim 11, wherein the overlapping data fragment overlaps all
9 of the already-received data fragment.

10
11 13. A method as in claim 11, wherein the overlapping data fragment overlaps less
12 than all of the already-received data fragment.

13
14 14. A method as in claim 11, wherein the steps are performed by an IP layer of a
15 receiving station's communication system.

16
17 15. A method of reducing a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from
18 fragmented IP datagrams, comprising the step of reducing a timeout for reassembling the
19 datagrams to less than a standard timeout.

1 16. A method as in claim 15, wherein the data fragment reassembly timeout is
2 reduced to 45 seconds from the standard timeout of 64 seconds.

3
4 17. A method as in claim 15, wherein the data fragment assembly timeout is
5 dynamically reduced based on NFS data for round-trip times between a sending station and a
6 receiving station.

7
8 18. A method as in claim 15, wherein the step is performed by an IP layer of a
9 receiving station's communication system.

10
11 19. A method of reducing a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from
12 fragmented IP datagrams, comprising the steps of:
13 receiving data fragments of a datagram having an IP identification number; and
14 reducing a remaining time for reassembling the datagram upon detection of a gap
15 in the received data fragments.

16
17 20. A method as in claim 19, wherein the remaining time for reassembling the
18 datagram is reduced to eight seconds.

19
20 21. A method as in claim 19, wherein the steps are performed by an IP layer of a
21 receiving station's communication system.

1 22. A method of reducing a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from
2 fragmented IP datagrams, comprising the steps of:
3 receiving data fragments of a first datagram having a protocol identification
4 number, a source address, and a first IP identification number; and
5 reducing a remaining time for reassembling the first datagram upon detection,
6 before receipt of a last data fragment of the first datagram, of a data fragment of a second
7 datagram having the protocol identification number and the source address but having a second
8 IP identification number.

9
10 23. A method as in claim 22, wherein the remaining time for reassembling the
11 datagram is reduced to eight seconds.

12
13 24. A method as in claim 22, wherein the steps are performed by an IP layer of a
14 receiving station's communication system.

15
16 25. A method of detecting a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from
17 fragmented IP datagrams, comprising the steps of:
18 detecting for communication errors between a sending station and a receiving
19 station; and
20 determining that the likelihood of misassembly is high upon detection that the
21 communication errors occur at a high rate for a predefined period of time.

1 26. A method as in claim 25, wherein the communication errors that are detected
2 include communication errors detected by an IP layer of the receiving station's communication
3 system.

4
5 27. A method as in claim 26, wherein the communication errors include receipt of
6 overlapping data fragments.

7
8 28. A method as in claim 26, wherein the communication errors include IP
9 datagram reassembly timeout errors.

10
11 29. A method as in claim 25, wherein the communication errors that are detected
12 include communication errors detected by a UDP layer of the receiving station's communication
13 system.

14
15 30. A method as in claim 29, wherein the communication errors include UDP
16 length errors.

17
18 31. A method as in claim 29, wherein the communication errors include UDP
19 checksum errors.

1 32. A method as in claim 25, wherein the communication errors that are detected
2 include communication errors detected by an NFS layer of the sending station's communication
3 system.

4
5 33. A method as in claim 25, further comprising the step of implementing
6 policies to reduce the likelihood of misassembly of data fragments upon determining that the
7 likelihood of misassembly is high.

8
9 34. A method as in claim 33, wherein implementing the policies further
10 comprises preferentially using TCP instead of UDP.

11
12 35. A method as in claim 33, wherein implementing the policies further
13 comprises using additional checksums.

14
15 36. A method as in claim 33, wherein implementing the policies further
16 comprises presenting a warning message to a system administrator.

17
18 37. A method for a sending station to detect a likelihood of misassembly at a
19 receiving station of data fragments from fragmented IP datagrams, comprising the steps of:
20 determining a rate at which an IP identification number generator associated with
21 the receiving station wraps around; and

1 determining that the likelihood of misassembly at the receiving station is high
2 upon determination that the IP identification number generator wraps around at faster than a
3 predetermined rate.
4

5 38. A method as in claim 37, wherein the predetermined rate is once every ninety
6 seconds.
7

8 39. A method as in claim 37, further comprising the step of implementing
9 policies to reduce the likelihood of misassembly of data fragments upon determining that the
10 likelihood of misassembly is high.
11

12 40. A method as in claim 39, wherein implementing the policies further
13 comprises preferentially using TCP instead of UDP.
14

15 41. A method as in claim 39, wherein implementing the policies further
16 comprises use of additional checksums.
17

18 42. A method as in claim 39, wherein implementing the policies further
19 comprises presenting a warning message to a system administrator.
20

1 43. A method as in claim 39, wherein the sending station maintains plural IP
2 identification number generators, and wherein implementing the policies further comprises
3 reducing a number of receiving stations associated with the IP identification number generator
4 that is wrapping around at faster than the predetermined rate.

5
6 44. A method for a sending station to detect a likelihood of misassembly at a
7 receiving station of data fragments from fragmented IP datagrams, comprising the steps of:
8 determining a rate at which an IP identification number generator associated with
9 the receiving station wraps around; and
10 determining that the likelihood of misassembly at the receiving station is high
11 upon determination both that (a) the IP identification number generator wraps around at faster
12 than a predetermined rate and (b) NFS re-transmissions are higher than a predetermined
13 threshold.

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PATENT TRADEMARK OFFICE

103.1043.01

Abstract

A method of generating IP identification numbers for IP datagrams. A plurality of IP identification number generators are maintained. A plurality of receiving stations are associated with the plurality of IP identification number generators such that each receiving station has an IP identification number generator associated therewith. An IP identification number is generated for a datagram sent to a receiving station based on an output of the associated IP identification number generator. Also, a method of reducing a likelihood of misassembly of received data fragments from fragmented IP datagrams. The data fragments have an IP identification number. All received data fragments of the datagram are discarded upon detection of receipt of an overlapping data fragment having the IP identification number. Timeouts for reassembling datagrams are reduced. First, timeouts for reassembling the datagrams are reduced to less than a standard timeout. Second, timeouts are reduced upon detection of a gap in the received data fragments. Third, timeouts are reduced upon detection of a datagram having the same protocol identification number and source address, but having a different IP identification number. Furthermore, a method of detecting a likelihood of misassembly of data fragments from fragmented IP datagrams. Communication errors between a sending station and a receiving station are detected. A rate is determined at which an IP identification number generator associated with the receiving station wraps around. NFS re-transmissions are determined. Based on one or more of these, a likelihood of misassembly at the receiving station is determined to be high.





FIG. 1






FIG. 3




FIG. 4




FIG. 5




FIG. 8




FIG. 9